Relativising the Relativisers

If I had been a dog with metaphysical tendencies (surely any pet-lover's nightmare?), all I would have needed to do is to sniff hard enough at things and people around me, and I would have found out that many of them are Relativists, in some way or the other. But, then, I might not have been able to argue with them (can dogs argue? --- that is a nice bone to chew on), and might have even spent my time barking up the wrong tree. In any case, I am not, unfortunately, a dog. I am human, only too human, and I must therefore try my best to find out what my Relativist friends are trying to say, even without possessing any refined canine olfactory powers. They come in various shapes and sizes, but I particularly relish an argument with the specific breed that goes under the label 'historical relativist' (two others of my choice breeds are the 'cultural relativist' and the 'anthropological relativist').

In effect, this is what a historical relativist says : There is no trans-historical truth. That sounds pretty dense, so let me 'unpack' that claim. What such a relativist is claiming is that there are no truth-claims that can transcend the boundaries of space and time, and that the very notions of 'truth', 'rationality' and 'reality' are internal to the specific socio-historical contexts within different people have lived in.

I shall give you two reasons why that claim must be rejected by historians, one 'logical' and the other 'practical'.

(A) The historical relativist is putting forward a claim X, such that X : There is no trans-historical truth. Let us ask ourselves : Is X itself a truth-claim or not? If it is not, perhaps the relativist is simply mumbling to herself in her solipsistic dream, and we shall let her sleep in peace. (Let sleeping dogs lie --- sure canine wisdom.) But if it is indeed a truth claim, then the relativist has undermined her position by setting forth at least one claim X which is supposed to be extra-historical, that is, to apply to all human beings irrespective of their spatio-temporal locations. In other words, the relativist believes that X is true for all human beings, something that she is not allowed to do by her own position which states that no such truths exist. Consequently, her position is a self-defeating one, for she has implicitly (and perhaps, unknowingly as well) made a claim that transcends all historical circumstances.

(B) Next, a 'practical' comment. It is highly ironical that it is a historian who is putting forward this relativistic claim, for if it were to be accepted as true, what would be left for historians to study? How would she study ancient Greek history and understand why the Athenians behaved in certain ways, or read texts from the Middle Ages and try to explain the reasons that their writers had given for believing in certain things, or, closer in time, describe the 'causes' of the American Revolution? If 'rationality' is so completely embedded in specific world-views that with the demise of a certain world-view the notion of rationality associated with it goes too, how could we (writing in 'late-capitalist' London in the year 2004, or 'anti-west' Tehran in the year 2004, or 'post-communist' Romania in the year 2004, or 'pro-globalisation' Bangalore in the year 2004) possibly reason why so many people in France and Russia took to the path of revolution, why the American colonists sought independence from the British crown, and why some Indian 'freedom fighters' became 'extremists' and the others 'moderates'?

Consider, in specific, the case of the set of events that are labelled as the 'French Revolution' : why did it happen? You can pile up reason after reason, starting from economic theory to sociological analysis to geopolitical enquiries to commercial considerations, and yet still feel yourself asking the question : but why did it happen? I suggest that the 'missing link' in the explanation is this trans-historical truth : human beings have a certain craving for freedom, in whatever way they understand this notion, and they will not endure, beyond certain limits, any system that denies them this freedom.

What have we learnt from this exercise in mental gymnastics? That, with a nod in the direction of the feminists, a dog might turn out, after all, to be a man's best friend when arguing with Relativists. (For women, of course, it is diamonds.) That is, we must rely on our submerged canine instincts to hunt out the buried relativistic presuppositions in whatever people say, and expose to them the vicious circularity of their claims. Therefore, the next time someone comes to you and grandiloquently proclaims, 'There is no Truth!', just play along with her for a while. And then gently prod her with this tantalising question : Is that assertion of yours itself a truth-claim? 'No', did she say? --- well then, you can reply that you just love the sound of her glorious voice, and can thank her for casting such enlightening pearls before metaphysical swine like you; 'Yes', did you hear her reply? --- but then she has sawed off the very branch that she is sitting on!