Living Along Fault-lines

My personal interest in that overburdened phrase ‘Islam and the West’ lies in the question of the relation between the two concepts of ‘religion’ and ‘culture’. Indeed, I believe that the ‘clash’ between Islam and the West ultimately revolves around different understandings of this relation. One way of investigation this relation is to start off by trying to define ‘religion’ and ‘culture’. However, as is well known to students of sociology and anthropology, this attempt can easily get bogged down in endless debate and controversy over what these concepts refer to. Therefore, I shall follow an alternative method : instead of trying to define these concepts, I shall outline the different ways in which people have, historically speaking, understood their mutual relation (or non-relation/anti-relation). Sometimes even when we cannot precisely define two terms A and B, an understanding of the relation between A and B can throw some light on what A and B themselves are.

A survey of the religious history of humanity reveals that there are four major ways in which the relation between ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ has been understood and put into socio-religious practice.

(A)

Religion Against Culture

This type emphasises the opposition between religion and culture. Whatever be the customs of the society in which the religious person lives, whatever be the human achievements that it conserves, religion is seen as being opposed to all of them. There is therefore a strict either-or between religion and culture. To be religious means that one must set his/her face completely against society.

Here are two examples :


(a) In the Graeco-Roman world, Christianity was totally opposed to what it perceived to be the idolatry of pagan culture. One of the popular Roman complaints against Christianity was that it was drawing young men and women from society and setting them against the ancient heritage of Greek civilisation. This was also true in the Mediaeval Ages when Christian monks and nuns rejected the world of culture as inherently corrupt and implicated in a sinister deal with devilish forces.

(b) Buddhism rejected the Brahmanic system of organisation of individual and social existence. With this rejection of casteism, went a whole-sale opposition to Brahmanic culture and everything that it entailed. The reason why Buddhism ultimately became a heterodox form of Hinduism was not because of its denial of the existence of 'God' (there were, and still are, Hindus who do not believe in 'God') but because of its opposition to contemporary culture. In other words, Buddhism was opposed not just to the Upanisadic-theological dimension of Hinduism but also to the cultural values it propagated.


(B)

Religion Of Culture

This type emphasises the fundamental agreement between religion and culture. A religious founder is regarded as the great hero of human culture and history and his (or her, in some rare cases) life and teachings are regarded as the greatest human achievement. It is believed that he brings to fulfilment the cultural aspirations of humankind. He confirms and supports whatever is best in culture and guides civilisation to its correct goal. Religion therefore is a part of culture in the sense that it includes the social heritage that must be transmitted and conserved.

Here are two examples :

(a) In the Mediaeval ages in Europe, the Catholic Church presented itself as fulfilling the best and the noblest elements in pagan culture. In other words, the Church emphasised that the teachings of Christianity brought contemporary culture into its proper fulfillment.

(b) Vedic Hinduism saw itself as providing the blue-print not only for religion but also for the varieties of cultural life. Indeed, for Vedic Hinduism, any separation between religion and culture was unknown. Culture was absorbed into religion and every cultural norm was legitimized through some religious practice or theological doctrine. For example, consider the question : is casteism a ‘religious’ or a ‘cultural’ system? From the perspective of Vedic Hinduism, one can only reply that this antithesis is misleading : casteism is at the same time both a religious and a cultural system.

(C)

Religion Above Culture

We now move into the third type. Those who follow this type agree with people in the second group on one point : religion is the fulfilment of culture. But they disagree with them on this point : there is a sharp discontinuity between religion and culture, and in this they agree with those in the first group. In other words, one cannot pass from religion and culture and vice versa as easily as in the case of, for example, Vedic Hinduism. There is therefore in religion something which does not follow immediately from culture. Religion is at the same time both continuous with and discontinuous with culture. Culture indeed leads men and women to religion but only in a partial, preliminary, and fragmented sense. A great leap is required if a person wants to move from culture to religion. True culture is possible only in the higher light of religious values.

Here are two examples :

(a) The ascetic tradition of Hinduism can be given as a good example of this type. Culture is not denounced as evil (as in the Type (A) above) but neither is there a direct step from culture to religion (as in the Type (B) above). Indeed, religion requires a rejection of certain elements of culture, which is good in itself (which is why the sannyasi is the world-renouncer), so that religious life requires a reordering of one’s value-system.

(b) Theravada Buddhism is another example of this type. In Thailand and Burma, Buddhism exists more or less harmoniously with various Hindu gods/goddesses and also belief in spirits (Burmese : nats). But it is emphasised repeatedly that the true Buddhist is not one who is immersed in the worship of gods and goddesses; the latter is a kind of ladder that one must throw away after one has reached the correct enlightenment. Thus Theravada Buddhism has a dialectical relation to the cultural life based on the Hinduism of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata : it both affirms the latter at a ‘lower’ level and rejects them at a ‘higher’ level.

(D)

Religion as Transformer of Culture

Those who fall in this group believe that religion has a conversionist function. We can better understand the claims of the people who belong to this group by contrasting their views with those of the previous ones.

In contrast to Type (A), those in this group argue that it is not enough simply to reject culture as devilish and move away from it. Rather, the diabolic elements in this culture must be transformed in the light of religious values.

In contrast to Type (B), it is argued that to say that one can move from culture to religion is to overlook the negative forms of injustice and inequalities that might be prevalent in culture. For example, slavery or patriarchy as a cultural institution can be uprooted only if there is some discontinuity between religion and culture. If religion is identified with culture without remainder, there remains no justification for opposing slavery or patriarchy.

In contrast to Type (C), it is argued that this answer is ultimately similar to Type (A). It is not enough to point out the discontinuities between religion and culture, the former should also be geared to removing the inequalities and the social injustices that are embodied in the latter.


With this survey, let me move on to make the following observations.

Though I started off by talking about Islam, it will be noticed that I have not mentioned Islam in any of the types so far. What we see from the above survey is that every religion has many strands in it, which is why we cannot claim that we have found the correct relation between a specific religion and culture. For example, I claimed that certain strands of Christianity can be placed in Type (A) (e.g.monastic Christianity) and other strands in Type (B) (e.g. the Holy Roman Empire). Similarly, there are elements of Hinduism which can be placed under Type (B) (e.g. Vedic Hinduism) and there are other elements in it which can be brought under Type (C) (e.g. ascetic Hinduism). In other words, we cannot provide a definite answer to this relation simply because no religion is a monolithic entity. There are complex strands within any religion and some of these strands may even contradict one another in certain respects. (To take just two examples, one can think of the endless debates over ‘idol-worship’ across the different traditions of Hinduism, and the question of whether Sufism is ‘orthodox’ Islam.)

What this means is also that we cannot say that there is only one way of conceptualising this relation in the case of Islam : we can place Islam both under Type (A) and Type (D). Islamic civilisation of the Baghdad Caliphate can perhaps be placed under Type (B). Type (A) is manifested in Islam’s vigorous denunciation (and destruction) of 'idol-worshipping' elements of surrounding culture. Type (D) is shown in the idea of an Islamic theocracy : every element of culture must be transformed in the light of Islamic doctrines.

Now one explanation for the strained relations between 'Islam and the West' is the following. ‘The West’, in general, has become very wary of systems that conceptualise the relation between ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ under Type (D). The notion that religion is a force that can transform culture is widely regarded as a reactionary one. Indeed, in the contemporary 'West', the preferred model seems to be some 'privatised' form of Type (B). Many a westerner will say : ‘I don’t care if you are religious so long as you do not go round disrupting and criticising my cultural values, whatever these may be. Religion is good as it is, but please do not let it interfere with my private life.’ This is something that Type (D) vigorously opposes : all cultural values without the light of religion are corrupt and vitiated by satanic forces.

In other words, one reason for the conflict between 'Islam and the West' is a difference of opinion over the importance that should be given to Type (D). ‘The West’ tends to reject Type (D) whereas it seems that Type (D) is almost required by the internal ‘logic’ of Islam. Islam is not, of course, the only religion that requires a Type (D) understanding of the relation between religion and culture : two other examples that come to mind immediately are John Calvin’s theocracy in Geneva and Ashokan Buddhism. Because of a long history of religious wars and oppression, however, ‘the West’ has made a decisive move away from Type (D) and religion has been stripped of all powers and channels to transform culture. A strict demarcation between the ‘religious’ and the ‘cultural’ spheres has been made : the former belongs to ‘private inner’ space and the latter to ‘public national’ space. In this situation, the rise of Islamic states under Type (D) which is regarded as confusing these two spaces heightens the opposition between ‘Islam and the West’.

I have said that the contemporary west broadly accepts Type (B). It looks at Type (A) as belonging to an age of persecution and religious tyranny. Now because of the conceptual similarity between Type (D) and Type (A), the 'West' feels that Islam can easily slip from Type (D) to Type (A), where Type (A) is equated with versions of ‘fundamentalisms’.

In truth, however, fundamentalism is possible even under Type (B). For example, contemporary Hindu fundamentalism is best placed not under Type (A) but under Type (B). Hindu fundamentalism does not reject culture but requires that it be absorbed into a certain specific understanding of what ‘Hinduism’ is. The problem is heightened by the fact that although critics of this fundamentalism can complain that Hinduism is being ‘politicised’, in truth there is no straightforward difference between ‘religion’, ‘culture’ and ‘politics’ in traditional Hinduism. Hindu fundamentalists can therefore claim that their interpretation of Hinduism is the traditional one, that is, in Hinduism, religion, culture and politics are intertwined. Another example of Type (B) relates to the socio-religious problems of the Middle East. The intimate connection between religion, land and culture in Israel and Palestine can be understood as a manifestation of this type.

To conclude then, I agree that an opposition between ‘Islam and the West’ is a genuine one. It is wrong, however, to think of this only as a modern contemporary phenomenon for it is as old as the Crusades. It is also wrong to think, however, that this opposition will always lead to ‘closure’ on all sides. The Mediaeval ages were the time of the Crusades, but they were also the time when a Moorish civilisation flourished. Indeed, Mediaeval Spain was one of the few times and places when Jews, Muslims and Christians lived together in harmony. This should not lead us to a facile optimism that another such culture will soon be formed, but it is only to serve as a reminder that oppositions need not always lead to a total breakdown in communication. Secondly, instead of talking about a clash between ‘civilisations’ one should rather talk about differences relating to the above types of conceptualising the relation between ‘religion’ and ‘culture’. ‘Civilisations’ do not exist in abstracto, they are not ‘things’ over and against people who have certain patterns of socio-religious behaviour, and indeed many of our problems begin precisely when we try to think of them as monolithic entities opposing one another.