Caesar Versus Christ
With the re-election of President George Bush, his detractors have become busy once again pointing out that the 'separation of 'politics' and 'religion' (or, in more archaic prose, the act of 'rendering unto Caesar's what is Caesar's) has been the hallmark of 'liberal democracies' such as the USA. What exactly, though, does this 'separation' refer to? Primarily, the stipulation that there shall be no discrimination in a ('public') court of law on the basis of one's ('private') religious belief; that is, to put it bluntly, an American Jew, an American Catholic, an American Protestant, an American Muslim, and an American Hindu are all equal in the 'eyes of the law'.
This has been the predominant interpretation of the First Amendment in the American Constitution which has been taken to imply that the 'public square' is agnostic about the truth-claims of various religious traditions. In other words, the American Government neither affirms nor denies the validity of the different claims that are made by the inhabitants of these different religious worlds. Or, at least, that is how the usual story goes. However, is it true that American administrations (even before George Bush et al.?) were able to maintain an agnostic perspective towards such claims, and thereby prevent the nakedness of the public square from being clothed by apparel which has come from a religious wardrobe? Consider the following three examples :
(a) In 1998, the USA Supreme Court ruled that Native Americans may not use peyote in their religious ceremonies, and also declared that this ruling was not an infringement of the First Amendment. In other words, the Native Americans were making a religious truth-claim X, such that X : The use of peyote is necessary for conducting our religious rituals, and the Supreme Court was claiming that this truth-claim was false. Moreover, this implies that X is false not only for Native Americans but for all Americans whosoever.
(b) In 1968, the USA Supreme Court ruled that the children of the members of the religious sect called Jehovah's Witness may be given blood transfusions, even if this was contrary to the wish of their parents. This time we have a religious truth-claim X, such that X : We, the members of Jehovah's Witness, shall not accept blood transfusions, and the Supreme Court was rejecting X.
(c) In a series of ruling starting from 1895, the Supreme Court ruled that the members of the Latter Day Saints (more commonly known as the Mormons) may not practise polygamy. This time, X is : We, the Mormons, believe that God requires us to practise polygamy, and it is precisely this X that is being rejected by the Supreme Court as false.
So, then, is it the case that the US Constitution believes that all religious claims are on par with respect to truth? It is obvious from the above examples that it is not; for if it were otherwise, it could not forbid Mormons from practising polygamy and members of Jehovah's Witness from refusing blood transfusion to their children. (By the way, my basic point, in this context, is not over whether 'truth' exists or not. Perhaps there is no such thing as 'truth', but the US Supreme Court, and, for that matter, the Supreme Court of any other country, regularly passes judgement on the assumption that there is such a 'thing'.)
There is more trouble to come for someone who wants to claim that the US Constitution is agnostic with respect to religious truth-claims. For example, here is a possible Islamic truth-claim : The laws of any country should be passed in order to implement what has been commanded by the Qu'ran. It is only too obvious that no American administration has accepted this truth-claim, and this is tantamount to saying : There is at least one religious truth-claim that has been rejected by the American Constitution.
In giving these examples, I do not mean to imply that the American separation of 'state' and 'religion' should be abruptly given up. Rather, it might be better if we went 'back to basics' and asked ourselves the following three questions :
(a) Is it possible to demarcate one sphere of human existence as 'religious' and the other as 'political'?
(b) If it is, what should be the 'state policy' towards those who refuse to believe that such a demarcation is possible?
(b) If such a demarcation is indeed possible, is it also possible that people may disagree with one another over where these lines of demarcation are located (or, should be located)?
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